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Abstract
A pedestrians guide aimed at the LHC laymen statisticians is presented. It
is not meant to replace any text book but to help the confused physicist to
understand the jargon and methods used by HEP Phystatisticians1
1 Introduction
The rst Phystat meeting was a workshop at CERN on Condence Limits followed by a similar workshop
at Fermilab. Fred James who organized the meeting with Louis Lyons presented then his personal wish
list titled: ‘What I would like to see‘. Fred wishes that physicists learn the vocabulary of statistics. This
pedestrian guide is aimed at the Atlas and CMS physicists who wish to become Phystatisticians so that
when ATLAS or CMS publish a combined limit or discovery signicance they will know what it is all
about.
When interpreting the result of the experiment, there are two alternate questions and one must
not confuse between them. Question number one would be: Did I or did I not establish a discovery?
Question number two would be: How well does my alternate model describe this discovery? The rst
question has to do with the goodness of the t of the observed data to the good and old Standard Model
while the second question has to do with hypotheses testing and the derivation of condence intervals
and upper limits. The LHC physics community is not only a mixture of physicists speaking all sorts of
languages, from Hebrew and Chinese to English, German and French but who are also refugees of all
sorts of experiments each with its preferred statistical method. Physicists educated at LEP advocate the
CLs method while some Tevatron physicists prefer Bayesian methods with some of their friends from
BaBar and Belle using pure frequentist methods. It seems that the only way out is to do it all... But, in a
way, as we will show, conceptually one way leads to another.
But in order to introduce the different methods and compare them a basic lesson in the related
statistics jargon is necessary.
2 Test Statistics
A test statistic is a quantity calculated from our sample of data. Its value can be used to estimate how
probable is the result that we observe with respect to some null hypothesis. A physicist’s intuition will
attribute the null hypothesis to the ’background only’ hypothesis. Normally it depends on the nature
of the problem, but in this write up we will stick to this denition. In this context the value of the test
statistic is used to decide whether or not the null hypothesis should be rejected in our hypothesis test.
It is important to note that the observed test statistics is based on our ONE experiment and could
be a result of years of data collecting! Normally to conclude anything based on the observed test statistic
one needs the pdf of the test statistic. This can sometimes be calculated analytically but can always be
generated with toy Monte Carlo experiments.
A consequence of the Neyman-Pearson lema is that if H0 is the null hypothesis (background only)
and H1 is the alternate hypothesis (say, a Higgs Boson with a mass m) then the most powerful test








1A Phystatistician is a Physicist who knows his way in Statistics and knows how Kendall‘s advanced theory of statistics
book looks like....
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Fig. 1: An illustration showing the control area α and the p − value of a Gaussian distribution. Note, in this
example Xobs > X5σ.
In a counting experiment s and b would be the average number of the expected signal and background
events and the Likelihoods would be derived from the data using Poisson statistics.
3 p-value
At LEP, trying to discover the Higgs boson, people examined the distribution of the observed 1 − CLb
as a function of the hypothesized Higgs mass and looked for troughs.... That might have been the right
thing to do but the wrong statistical jargon. A discovery by denition is a deviation from the Standard
Model, i.e. the "background only" hypothesis (H0). Given the pdf of the test statistic for background
only experiments, it is common in HEP to announce a discovery if the result is at least 5 σ away from
the expectation. Given a pdf g(x|H0) of the test statistic x, one can dene a control area of size α at
the tail of the pdf distribution (for this example let us assume that the less probable result is on one side
of the distribution only), i.e. α = ∫∞x5σ g(x|H0)dx (Figure 1). If the observed result xobs > x5σ then




g(x|H0)dx and it is smaller than α. This probability is called the p − value and a discovery
is considered when p < α. This means also that the background-only hypothesis is rejected with a
probability of 1− p.
Historically physicists have the tendency to mix condence with p-value. In looking for the Higgs,
the LEP experiments used the ‘condence level in the background, 1 − CLb(mH), where CLb(mH) is
dened as the tail area CLb =
∫ xobs
−∞ g(x|H0)dx, with the statistic x being the log likelihood ratio for
the background plus signal model (i.e. Standard Model with Higgs of mass mH ) as compared with
background only (i.e. H0, the Standard Model with no Higgs in the observable mass range). This
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implies that in an ensemble of backgound only experiments, a fraction 1 − CLb would be expected to
have a larger value than the observed value. The terminology is confusing since 1 − CLb is in fact a p
value. The LEP experiments were looking for tiny values of 1−CLb, which would indicate a very large
uctuation of the background (or the presence of a signal), but none was found. The correspondence
between the hypothesis test property 1 − p and the background condence estimation, CLb is further
discussed in [1].
4 The Look Elsewhere Effect
The Standard Model predicts a Higgs Boson but not its mass. It can be anywhere up to a few hundreds of
GeV. We can specify an hypothesis with a specic Higgs mass but had we observed some possible signal
we should take into account that this signal could be a uctuation which could be observed anywhere in
our sensitivity range [2]. Here we change the signal hypothesis from a Higgs with a specic mass mH to
a Higgs with some mass in the observed region. It is not clear how to take these effects into account. One
common way is to degrade the observed p-value by multiplying it by the size of the sensitivity region
divided by the experimental resolution. A common claim is that the control region for discovery is so
small that "who cares".... Another common belief is that the "look elsewhere effect" is the reason for the
habit of dening a discovery as a 5σ and not for example 4σ, because even if you quote 5σ your effective
signicance is lower.
5 Confidence Intervals and Coverage
Assume you have a measurement mmeas of m with mt being the true value of m and suppose you know
the pdf p(mmeas|m). You use some method to calculate a 90% condence interval [m1,m2]. What does
it mean?
Most physicists interpret it as if the probability that there is a Higgs Boson with mt ∈ [m1,m2] is
90%. However, this is totally wrong. If you run a bunch of toy Monte Carlo experiments, each one will
yield a different interval. The correct statement is that if there is a Higgs with a mass, mt, then, in an
ensemble of experiments, 90% of the obtained condence intervals will contain the true value of m, m t.
More on the source of this misconception in section 6.
Subsequent to the above denition of interval is the notion of coverage. The condence interval is
estimated using the physicist preferable method. If in an ensemble of Monte Carlo experiments the true
value of m is covered within (e.g.) 90% of the estimated condence intervals, we claim a coverage. If it
occurs less than 90%, the method is claimed to undercover.
Some physicists doubt the importance of coverage. Their claim is that coverage answers the wrong
question. What we really want to know, so they claim, is the probability that the Higgs Boson exists and
is in the specied mass interval. So there are two possibilities here. Either educate the physicists about
the correct meaning of coverage or try to answer the "right" question...
6 Subjective Bayesian
What is the "right" question? It must be: Is there a Higgs Boson? When pronouncing this question, I
cannot escape from an immediate association to the question: Is there a God? Can one really answer this
question based on the data (earth)? The answer is yes, but with many signicant prior assumptions....
each weakens the credibility of the answer.
I believe that the source of the common misconception regarding the interpretation of a condence
interval is that our mind is sometimes acting in a Bayesian manner. We try to deduce something about
the Higgs ("asking the right question"), we derive a condence integral and translates it to our degree of
belief that there is a Higgs given the data, i.e. Prob(mt ∈ [m1,m2]|data).
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A model (A Higgs Boson with a mass m) can only be assigned a degree of belief, but not a
probability in a frequentist manner (i.e. as a random variable in a repetitive set of experiments).




where pi(Higgs) is the prior for a Higgs Boson which many times is taken to be uniform in the Higgs
mass (or simply 1) without even noticing!
Last comment here; in this approach instead of talking about condence intervals we talk about
credible intervals, where p(Higgs|data) is the credibility of the Higgs given the data.
7 The Likelihood Principle
Bayesian inference obeys by denition the Likelihood Principle (LP). According to this, the Likelihood
function L({θ}) contains the full information from the experimental data. A consequence to the LP is
that methods that provide different results for a measurement yet have proportional likelihood functions
are inconsistent. A nice discussion about the LP can be found in [3].
8 Who is Afraid of Nuisance Parameters?
The answer to the question appearing in the title is nobody, yet everybody.... Nobody, because Nuisance
parameters is just the term used by statisticians for what we physicists refer to as systematics. Everybody,
because systematics can kill an experimental observation if not under control. The signicance of an
observation is given in the limit of large numbers as S/
√
B, however, this number is degraded in the
presence of a systematic uncertainty ∆ on the background and becomes S/
√
B(1 + ∆2 ·B), which in
the limit of innite luminosity (and large B) becomes SB·∆ . So if there is 10% background uncertainty,
one will never reach a 5σ signicance if S/B < 0.5.
Physicists nd difculties in both classifying and estimating the systematic uncertainties and im-
plementing them in the analysis interpretation. There are systematic errors that reduce with increasing
statistics and therefore can be handled, and those that do not. In what follows, we will concentrate on the
possible treatment of systematics in the interpretation phase of the analysis.
9 Integrating Out the Systematic Errors
When applied to Bayesian credibilities, integrating out the systematics via marginalization with a prior is
a natural thing to do. If we denote by s the Higgs signal, by b the background which has some systematic
uncertainty, the equation in section 6 becomes
p(s, b|data) = L(s, b|data)pi(s, b)
Normalization
The prior is often assumed to factorize pi(s, b) = pi(s)pi(b) with the signal prior taken to be at. Hence
the background systematics is explicitly included in the background prior. We can then integrate the
background systematics via p(s|data) = ∫ p(s, b|data)db.
Integrating the nuisance parameters is also used in the so called Cousins-Highland hybrid-frequentist
technique [4]. Here the recipe is given by p(data, data′|s) = ∫ p(data|s, b)p(b|data′)db where the data
is used for the main measurement and the data′ for the auxiliary measurement of the background (e.g.
via a side band). It is to be noted that one can fake an auxiliary measurement in order to apply for exam-





A prior, e.g. pi(λ) is interpreted as a description of what we believe about a parameter λ preceding the
current experiment. One can distinguish two kinds of priors. Informative priors which are based on some
information one has on λ and uninformative priors. When the parameter is that of no-interest (nuisance)
an auxiliary measurement might supply a legitimate basis for an informative prior. The Higgs signal, on
the other hand, is a parameter of interest. Some would say that all priors of the parameters of interest
should be uninformative. I would say that using the lower bound of 115 GeV on the Higgs mass as part
of a prior, is hard to argue with..... But note also that choosing a prior is a science by itself. A prior at
in the coupling g is not at in the cross section σ ∼ g2. That led to the development of reference priors
[5]. Reference priors have a minimal effect (relative to the data) on our prospective nal inference. In
the simple one dimensional case, with one parameter, the reference prior is reduced to the Jeffry’s prior
which is metric invariant, i.e.
∫
L(data|s, λ)pi(λ)dλ = ∫ L(data|s, λ)pi(f(λ))df and can be easily
obtained in an analytic way.
11 Doing Justice with the CLs Method
In section 3 we dened the condence level CLb. In a similar manner one can dene the signal+background
condence level CLs+b. But what is the meaning of a signal condence level? Using the terminology of
condence levels CLs was dened as CLs ≡ CLs+bCLb [6].
The CLs method is the most discredited method in HEP statistical inference.The reason is that
it lacks a frequentist coverage. However, it lacks it in places where the experiment is insensitive to the
expected signal! And this is not necessarily a disadvantage from some physicists point of view! Here is
what happens:
One uses the Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio as a test statistics (see section 2) and construct its
pdf for background only and signal+background experiments. When the expected signal is very low
the two pdf are almost overlapping (see Figure 2). When the number of observed events uctuates far
below the expected background, both hypotheses s(mH), s(mH) + b are not favored, yet, given the low
p-value of the s + b hypothesis ps+b = 3% for example, one might exclude the s(mH) + b hypothesis
and the common physicist will interpret the result as if a Higgs with a mass mh (e.g. 116 GeV in LEP
case) is excluded at the 97% Condence Level. But this is a false statement. To protect against such
an inference one denes a new quantity with an unfortunate name CLs = ps+b1−pb . In the limit of a light
Higgs mass CLs mH↓−→ CLs+b. As a result the false exclusion rate is too low for heavy Higgs Bosons, i.e.
the method undercovers where the experiment lacks sensitivity. However this is conservative because it
avoids excluding when there is no sensitivity, while simple usage of the pure frequentist CLs+b could
result in an exclusion.
12 Neyman Construction
The Neyman construction is a method of parameter estimation that ensures coverage. One scans over
all the possible true values of some parameter s and denes an acceptance interval for each s, based
on the known pdf, g(sm|s), of the measured sm given a possible true s (there is only ONE unknown




g(sm|s)dsm = 68%} (Figure 3). Even in the simplest case where g is a Gaussian, there is
an ambiguity in the choice of the integration limit, which will lead to two-sided intervals, or one-sided
integral bounded from below or above. To sort out the integration limits one needs to specify an ordering
rule. The construction of the acceptance intervals for all s turns out to be a belt from which one can easily
get the corresponding (e.g.) 68% condence interval [sd, su](so) (see section 5), given one measurement
so via inversion (Figure 3). Due to space limitations there is no way I can describe here the Neyman
construction in the necessary detail. Full descriptions can be found in [7].
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Fig. 2: An illustration showing the reasoning of the CLs method. In this situation a signal+background hypothesis
might be rejected though the experiment has no sensitivity to observe that particular signal.
13 The Feldman-Cousins Method
The full Neyman construction was introduced to HEP by Feldman and Cousins [8]. The test statistic is the
likelihood ratio Q(s) = L(s+b)L(sˆ+b) where sˆ is the physically allowed mean s that maximizes the Likelihood
L(sˆ + b). To construct an acceptance 68% interval in the number of observed events, [n1, n2], one is
using Q as an ordering rule, i.e.
∑n2
n1
p(n|s, b) ≥ 68% where only terms with decreasing order of Q(n)
are included in the sum, till the sum exceeds the 68% condence. When no events are observed, one is
using this constructed Neyman belt to derive a condence interval, which, depending on the observation,
might be a one-sided or a two-sided interval. This method is therefore called the unied method, because
it avoids a ip-op of the inference (i.e. one decides to ip from a limit to an interval if the result is
signicant enough...).
The difculty with this approach is that an experiment with higher expected background which ob-
serves no events might set a better upper limit than an experiment with lower or no expected background.
This would never occur with the CLs method.
Another difculty is that this approach does not incorporate a treatment of nuisance parameters.
However, it can either be plugged in "by hand", using the hybrid Cousins and Highland method [9] or a
Neyman construction can be performed, as described below.
14 The Profile Likelihood Full Construction Method
Treating the background as a nuisance parameter, one can perform a full Neyman construction with the




. This is a very cumbersome construction.
In this relatively simple example, the construction is done in a 4-dimensional space, the two observables








Fig. 3: An illustration showing the Neyman belt. The horizontal lines are the acceptance intervals in the mea-
sured parameter space sm for a given possible true s, [sl, sh](s). Given an observation so one can construct the
confidence interval [sd, su].
low dimensional toy models were fully constructed [10]. To ease the procedure an approximate Neyman
construction was suggested [11] by xing ˆˆb to be ˆˆb(s, nobs). Gary Feldman does not recommend to try
the full construction at home for many reasons [12]. One of them is that using a simple Prole Likelihood
method works quite well.
15 The Profile Likelihood Method
The simplest way to incorporate systematics into hypothesis inference is the Prole Likelihood. High
Energy Physicists are unaware of their familiarity with this method via its implementation in the MINOS
process within MINUIT [13].





is the MLE of b given s and sˆ, bˆ are the MLE of s and b. When generating experiments, each with data
distributed according to Poisson(n, s + b) we nd that the pdf of −2lnλ(s) is distributed as a χ2(1).
This is not surprising since in the asymptotic limit the Likelihood function L(s) becomes a Gaussian
centered about the ML estimator sˆ, i.e. lnL(sˆ ± Nσsˆ) = lnLmax − N22 . The magic of the Prole
Likelihood method is that the χ2 approximation works very well and there is no need for toy Monte
Carlo experiments... One can calculate the exclusion or discovery sensitivity or signicance in a fraction
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